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I.  Introduction 
On January 21, 2013, during his inauguration, President Obama 
insisted on equality for “our gay brothers and sisters,” words few ever 
expected to hear in a president’s inaugural address.1  The Obama 
                                                                                                     
 * J.D. 2008, University of Georgia School of Law; B.A. 2004, Emory University. 
 1. Ewan MacAskill, Obama’s second inauguration:  ‘We are made for this moment,’ 
THE GUARDIAN (Jan. 21, 2013), http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2013/jan/21/obama-sets-
goals-unite-inauguration-speech. 
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administration’s record on equal rights is likewise unprecedented.  Since 
President Obama first took office in early 2009, there have been dozens of 
changes in federal agencies2 benefitting Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, and 
Transgender (hereinafter, “LGBT”) people and their families.  For example:  
1) The federal government expanded its Equal Employment Opportunity 
policy that explicitly prohibits discrimination on the basis of sexual 
orientation, to include, for the first time, gender identity;3 2) Nearly every 
hospital in the United States is now required to have a written policy that 
explicitly allows a patient to designate whomever he or she wants to visit 
them in hospitals, including LGBT families;4 3) Virtually any housing 
program touched by the federal government is prohibited from 
discriminating on the basis of sexual orientation or gender identity due to a 
rule issued by the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development,5 
thus providing protection for LGBT people in important programs like 
Section 8 Housing Vouchers and Fair Housing Authority backed 
mortgages; and 4) In the health insurance marketplaces that will be set up in 
2014 under the Affordable Care Act, health insurance plans will not be 
allowed to discriminate on the basis of sexual orientation or gender 
identity.6 
Further, federal agencies have issued guidance to state and local 
officials clarifying their non-discrimination obligations under applicable 
federal law.  While guidance from an agency is not legally binding,7  it does 
have the ability to direct national policy, and in many cases these policy 
guidance documents have life-altering impacts on LGBT people and 
families.  One such guidance document from the U.S. Department of 
Education ensures that local school officials are aware that students have a 
                                                                                                     
 2. Federal agencies are charged with interpreting and implementing federal law.  
They are directly influenced by the President’s policy as federal agencies are generally 
controlled by the President through cabinet secretaries, whom the President appoints. 
 3. See ACLU, Administration Adds Gender Identity To Equal Employment 
Opportunity Policies (Jan. 5, 2010), http://www.aclu.org/lgbt-rights/administration-adds-
gender-identity-equal-employment-opportunity-policies. 
 4. See 42 C.F.R. § 482.13. 
 5. See 24 C.F.R. § 5.105. 
 6. See 42 C.F.R. § 155.120; see also http://www.feminist.org/news/newsbyte/uswire 
story.asp?id=14140 (describing a memo released by the DOD, outlining a plan to extend 
benefits to same-sex partners of military members to ensure fairness and equal treatment and 
to take care of service members and their families to the extent allowable under the law). 
 7. See OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL REGISTER, A GUIDE TO THE RULEMAKING PROCESS, 
https://www.federalregister.gov/uploads/2011/01/the_rulemaking_process.pdf (explaining 
that agencies have the authority to create rules to carry out policy mandates, which have the 
force and effect of law and are codified in the Code of Federal Regulations). 
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federal right to organize Gay Straight Alliances and other student 
organizations on their campuses and cannot be denied access to the use of 
school facilities for the purposes of holding organization meetings.8 
In addition, the Obama administration has taken a more liberal 
approach than any previous administration in its stance on treating LGBT 
individuals equally regardless of whether such treatment is required by law 
and even where doing so is in contravention to current law.  For example, in 
2011, President Obama instructed the Justice Department to stop defending 
the Defense of Marriage Act.9  He also signed the Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell 
Repeal Act of 2010 into law.10  Administration officials testified in support 
of the Employment Non-Discrimination Act in the House and the Senate in 
the 111th Congress.11  Finally, in May of 2012 President Obama announced 
his support for marriage equality nationwide.12 
In light of the Obama Administration’s previous actions on behalf of 
LGBT individuals and their families, additional LGBT policy advances are 
likely in his second term.13  This Article looks at whether such policy 
advances are likely to be made in the area of employment discrimination 
protection.  Federal law, as currently interpreted, does not provide 
protection for employees discriminated against on the basis of sexual 
                                                                                                     
 8. See Arne Duncan, Key Policy Letters from the Education Secretary and Deputy 
Secretary, U.S. DEP’T. OF EDUC. (June 14, 2011), available at 
www2.ed.gov/policy/elsec/guid/secletter/110607.html; see also NATIONAL GAY AND 
LESBIAN TASK FORCE, Movement Analysis: The Impact of 2012 Presidential Election on the 
LGBT Policy Agenda, (Nov. 7, 2012), available at http://www.thetaskforce.org/downloads/ 
reports/reports/move_analyisis_2012_elec_obama.pdf, 4–5. 
 9. See Defense of Marriage Act (“DOMA”), Pub. L. No. 104-199, 1 U.S.C. § 7, 28 
U.S.C. §.1738C (1996); see also Z. Byron Wolf, President Obama Instructs Justice 
Department to Stop Defending Defense of Marriage Act calls Clinton Signed Law 
“Unconstitutional,” ABC NEWS (Feb. 23, 2011, 12:39 pm) http://abcnews.go.com/blogs/ 
politics/2011/02/president-obama-instructs-justice-department-to-stop-defending-defense-of-
marriage-act-calls-clinton/.  The Supreme Court agreed that DOMA was unconstitutional in 
its July 2013 opinion, holding DOMA violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fifth 
Amendment to the Constitution.  See United States v. Windsor, 133 S.Ct. 2675 (2013). 
 10. See Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell Repeal Act of 2010 (H.R. 2965, S.4023) (repealing 
DADT 10 U.S.C. § 654). 
 11. See HUMAN RIGHTS CAMPAIGN, Obama Administration Policy, Legislative and 
Other Advancements on behalf of LGBT Americans, http://www.hrc.org/resources/ 
entry/obama-administration-policy-and-legislative-advancements-on-behalf-of-lgbt (last 
visited June 24, 2013). 
 12. Id. 
 13. Id. 
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orientation and there is arguably little protection against discrimination on 
the basis of gender identity.14  
Despite an overwhelming majority of the population in favor of legal 
protection,15 LGBT individuals continue to experience discrimination in 
large numbers. A survey of almost 6,500 transgender individuals found that 
nearly half of respondents had experienced an adverse employment action, 
such as denial of a job, denial of a promotion, or termination of 
employment, as a result of their transgender status and/or gender 
nonconformity.16  Fifty percent reported harassment by someone at work,17 
forty-five percent stated that co-workers had referred to them using 
incorrect gender pronouns “repeatedly and on purpose,”18 and fifty-seven 
percent confessed that they delayed their gender transition in order to avoid 
discriminatory actions and workplace abuse.19  In one survey, thirty-eight 
percent of openly lesbian, gay, or bisexual employees reported 
discrimination while ten percent of those who were not open regarding their 
sexual orientation reported discrimination.20  Up to forty-one percent of 
LGBT employees have been verbally or physically harassed or had their 
workplaces vandalized.21 
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 declares it unlawful to 
discriminate against a person in employment because of such individual's 
                                                                                                     
 14. See infra Part II. 
 15. See Victoria Schwartz, Title VII:  A Shift from Sex to Relationships, 35 HARV. J.L. 
& GENDER 209, 210–11 (2012) (“[A] 2007 poll found that only one-third of American adults 
were aware that federal law . . . does not provide protection for employees on the basis of 
sexual orientation.  At the same time, public opinion polls suggest that Americans do not 
find the idea of protection against employment discrimination based on sexual orientation 
particularly controversial.  A 2008 Gallup poll found that support for homosexuals having 
equal rights in job opportunities jumped from fifty-six percent in 1977 to eighty-nine percent 
in 2011.”). 
 16. See Jaime M. Grant, et al., Injustice at Every Turn: A Report of the National 
Transgender Discrimination Survey (Feb. 3, 2011), http://www.thetaskforce.org/ 
downloads/reports/reports/ntds_full.pdf. 
 17. See id. at 58. 
 18. Id. at 62. 
 19. See id. at 63; see also Jason Lee, Lost in Transition: The Challenges of Remedying 
Transgender Employment Discrimination under Title VII, 35 HARV. J. OF L. & GENDER 423, 
424–425 (2012). 
 20. Jennifer Pizer, Christy Mallory, Brad Sears, & Nan Hunter, Evidence of Persistent 
and Pervasive Workplace Discrimination Against LGBT People: The Need for Federal 
Legislation Prohibiting Discrimination and Providing for Equal Employment Benefits, 45 
LOY. L.A. L. REV. 715, 723 (2012), available at http://williamsinstitute.law.ucla.edu/wp-
content/uploads/Pizer-Mallory-Sears-Hunter-ENDA-LLR-2012.pdf. 
 21. Id. 
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sex.  In recent years, federal courts have expanded the interpretation of Title 
VII’s prohibition of sex discrimination to include gender based 
discrimination, recognizing that sex includes personality attributes, socio-
sexual roles, and behavioral expressions, such as masculinity and 
femininity.  The Supreme Court announced, “in forbidding employers to 
discriminate against individuals because of their sex, Congress intended to 
strike at the entire spectrum of disparate treatment of men and women 
resulting from sex stereotypes.”22  Further, the Supreme Court has held that 
same-sex sexual harassment is actionable under Title VII.23  Nevertheless, 
protection against discrimination on the basis of gender identity remains 
limited and Title VII does not provide any protection against discrimination 
based on sexual orientation.  In this article, I will explore the likelihood that 
an expansion of protection against gender identity and sexual orientation 
discrimination will take place during President Obama’s second term in 
office.  First, I will discuss recent Supreme Court, circuit court, and Equal 
Employment Opportunity Commission precedent analyzing Title VII in 
order to establish the status of current sexual orientation and gender identity 
discrimination protection jurisprudence.  Second, as an alternative to 
judicial interpretation, I will discuss the possibility that anti-discrimination 
federal legislation will be passed, such as in the form of the Employment 
Non-Discrimination Act (the “ENDA”) or an amendment to Title VII.  In 
order to do so, I will analyze the current make-up of Congress, campaign 
rhetoric and propaganda the winning candidates used during the 2012 
election cycle, and Congress’s history on equal protection issues, including 
its failure to pass previous versions of the ENDA.  Next, I will argue that 
the best hope for expanded protection on the federal level during Obama’s 
second term in office may lie in a new interpretation of Title VII 
jurisprudence.  Finally, I will conclude by arguing that the best method to 
achieve long-lasting discrimination protection lies in amending Title VII’s 
definition of sex to prohibit all gender and sexuality based discrimination—
even if such an advancement is unlikely to happen during the President’s 
remaining time in office. 
                                                                                                     
 22. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 251 (1989) (internal quotations 
omitted). 
 23. See Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., 523 U.S. 75 (1998). 
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II. State of the Law 
A. Case Law 
For the most part, employment in the United States is at-will and 
unless expressly forbidden by state or federal law,24  or private contract, 
employers can generally terminate an employee for any reason or no reason 
at all.25  This means that in those states where state law fails to protect 
LGBT individuals, their employers may freely discriminate against them 
unless courts find that they are already protected by Title VII or until some 
new federal law is passed. 
Title VII provides in relevant part, “[i]t shall be an unlawful 
employment practice for an employer (1) to fail or refuse to hire or to 
discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any 
individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges 
of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex or 
                                                                                                     
 24. See Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88–352, 78 Stat. 241, 253 (July 2, 1964) 
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.§ 2000e-2000e-17 (2006) (noting that the Equal 
Employment Opportunity Commission enforces the prohibitions against employment 
discrimination in Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964; see also Equal Pay Act of 1963 
(as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 206); Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (as 
amended, 29 U.S.C. § 621); Rehabilitation Act of 1973 § 501, 504, 29 U.S.C. § 701; 
Americans with Disabilities Act of 1009 Titles I and V, 42 U.S.C. § 12101; Genetic 
Information Non-Discrimination Act Title II, 29 U.S.C. § 216(e); Civil Rights Act of 1964, 
42 U.S.C.§ 1981. These laws collectively prohibit discrimination on the basis of race, color, 
sex, religion, national origin, age, disability, and genetic information, as well as prohibit 
retaliation for protected activity.  Additionally, since 1978, under the Civil Service Reform 
Act, as amended, federal government applicants and employees shall not be discriminated 
against on the basis of race, color, sex, religion, national origin, age, disability, marital 
status, political affiliations, or on conduct which does not adversely affect the performance 
of the applicant or employee—including sexual orientation or gender identity status.  The 
Office of Special Counsel and the Merit Systems Protection Board enforce the prohibitions 
against federal employment discrimination codified in the CSRA and more recent EEO 
policies.  Further, the Department of Justice provides a system for adjudicating complaints 
of sexual orientation and gender identity discrimination by its employees. This separate 
process does not include the same rights offered under Title VII and the EEOC regulations 
set forth under 29 C.F.R. Part 16144.  The complaints are processed utilizing the same EEO 
complaint process and time frames,including an ADR program,an EEO investigation, and an 
issuance of a final Agency decision; however, the Dept. of Justice process allows for fewer 
remedies and does not include the right to request a hearing before an EEOC Administrative 
Judge or the right to appeal the final Agency decision to the Commission. 
 25. See Lisa J. Bernt, Finding the Right Jobs for the Reasonable Person in 
Employment Law, 77 U. MO. KAN. CITY L. REV. 1, 7 (2008) (“[E]mployment-at-will is still 
the default rule in almost every jurisdiction in the United States.”). 
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national origin.”26  “Title VII was initially included as part of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964 as a measure designed to combat racial 
discrimination.”27  The day before the House of Representatives was due to 
vote on the Act, Representative Howard Smith, a staunch opponent of the 
bill, introduced a floor amendment adding “sex” to the list of impermissible 
bases for employment discrimination as a last-ditch effort to blunt 
legislative support and prevent the bill's passage.28  Representative Smith’s 
plan backfired and Title VII was enacted with the sex provision intact.29  
“The amendment’s late adoption, however, prevented legislators from 
engaging in a robust debate regarding the inclusion of ‘sex’ as a protected 
class and resulted in a paucity of legislative guidance as to the intended 
scope of the protection.”30 
No federal statute proscribes employment discrimination on the basis 
of sexual orientation or gender identity, nevertheless, over the last several 
decades there have been a number of claims made in federal court premised 
on the idea that sexual orientation and gender identity discrimination are 
sex discrimination under Title VII and employers should not be allowed to 
discriminate against an employee simply because he or she believes that the 
employee seeks intimate relationships with individuals of the “wrong” sex. 
Lower courts are reluctant to find that these types of claims can be made 
under existing law. Courts have pointed to the absence of relevant and 
affirmative congressional intent to apply Title VII in this manner and 
concluded that Title VII does not prohibit discrimination on the basis of 
either sexual orientation or gender identity.31  While some courts have 
allowed sex-stereotyping claims by LGBT employees, others have 
refused.32 
As a result, forty-nine years after the passage of Title VII, courts are 
still struggling to determine the meaning of “sex.” In many contexts, the 
definition of what constitutes sex discrimination has expanded over the 
                                                                                                     
 26. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2006). 
 27. Jason Lee, Lost in Transition: The Challenges of Remedying Transgender 
Employment Discrimination Under Title VII, 35 HARVARD J.L. & GENDER 423, 430 (2012). 
 28. See id. at 430. 
 29. See id.  
 30. Id. 
 31. See Employment Discrimination—Congress Considers Bill To Prohibit 
Employment Discrimination On The Basis Of Sexual Orientation And Gender Identity—
Employment Nondiscrimination Act of 2009, H.R. 3017, 111th Cong. (2009), 123 HARV. L. 
REV. 1803, 1805 (2010). 
 32. See id. 
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years.  This discussion focuses on how the changing definition of “sex” has 
impacted the rights of those discriminated against on the basis of gender 
identity or sexual orientation. 
i.  Gender Identity 
In the seminal case of Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins,33 the Supreme 
Court held that discrimination for failing to conform with gender-based 
expectations violates Title VII’s prohibition against sex-based 
discrimination.34  In that case, an employer refused to make a female senior 
manager a partner in the business, at least in part because she did not act as 
some of the other partners thought that a woman should act.35  She was 
informed that to improve her chances for partnership, she should “walk 
more femininely, talk more femininely, dress more femininely, wear make-
up, have her hair styled, and wear jewelry.”36  In finding for the employee, 
the Court stated, “[i]n the context of sex stereotyping, an employer who acts 
on the basis of a belief that a woman cannot be aggressive, or that she must 
not be, has acted on the basis of gender” in violation of Title VII's 
prohibition of sex-based discrimination.37  “[W]e are beyond the day when 
an employer could evaluate employees by assuming or insisting that they 
matched the stereotype associated with their group, for ‘[i]n forbidding 
employers to discriminate against individuals because of their sex, 
Congress intended to strike at the entire spectrum of disparate treatment of 
men and women resulting from sex stereotypes.’”38 
Following the logic and the language of the Supreme Court’s opinion 
in Price Waterhouse, in Schwenk v. Hartford39 the Ninth Circuit concluded 
that discrimination against transgender females is actionable discrimination 
“because of sex.”40  In that case, the Ninth Circuit found that a prison guard 
knew that a prisoner considered herself a transsexual and that the guard had 
targeted the prisoner only after acquiring that knowledge, and that the guard 
                                                                                                     
 33. See 490 U.S. 228 (1989). 
 34. See id.  
 35. See id. at 230–31, 235. 
 36. Id. at 235. 
 37. See id. at 250. 
 38. Id. at 251 (noting neither Justice White, nor Justice O’Connor, each of whom 
concurred in the judgment, had any quarrel with that proposition)  (quoting L.A. Dept. of 
Water and Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 707 (1978) and Sprogis v. United Air Lines, 
Inc., 444 F.2d 1194, 1198 (7th Cir. 1971)). 
 39. 204 F.3d 1187, 1201–02 (9th Cir. 2000). 
 40. See id. 
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was motivated, at least in part, by the prisoner's gender—that is, by the 
prisoner’s feminine, rather than a typically masculine, appearance or 
demeanor.41  On these facts, the Ninth Circuit concluded that the guard’s 
attack against the prisoner constituted discrimination because of gender 
within the meaning of both the Gender Motivated Violence Act, 42 U.S.C. 
§ 13981, and Title VII.42  The Ninth Circuit concluded that discrimination 
against transgender females is actionable discrimination “because of sex” 
under Price Waterhouse because: 
[I]n the mind of the perpetrator the discrimination is related to the 
sex of the victim: here, for example, the perpetrator’s actions 
stem from the fact that he believed that the victim was a man who 
‘failed to act like’ one . . . . Discrimination because one fails to 
act in the way expected of a man or woman is forbidden under 
Title VII.43 
Under the same sex stereotyping analysis, courts in a number of 
jurisdictions have held that transsexual people can successfully argue 
claims under Title VII’s prohibition against sex discrimination.44  For 
example, in Smith v. City of Salem45 the plaintiff was diagnosed with 
                                                                                                     
 41. See id. 
 42. See id.  
 43. Id. at 1202. 
 44. See, e.g., Rosa v. Park West Bank & Trust Co., 214 F.3d 213 (1st Cir. 2000) 
(reinstating Equal Credit Opportunity Act claim on behalf of biologically male plaintiff who 
alleged that he was denied an opportunity to apply for a loan because he was not dressed in 
“masculine attire”); Rentos v. OCE-Office Systems, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19060 
(S.D.N.Y. 1996) (refusing to dismiss transsexual woman’s claim that she had been 
discriminated against on the basis of sex in violation of the New York State Human Rights 
Law and the New York City Human Rights Law); Enriquez v. West Jersey Health Sys., 777 
A.2d 365 (N.J. Super. 2001) (concluding that state law prohibiting sex discrimination in 
employment protects transsexual people); Maffei v. Kolaeton Industry, Inc., 626 N.Y.S.2d 
391 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1995) (finding that a city ordinance prohibiting “gender” discrimination 
protects transsexuals and disagreeing with the reasoning of federal cases which hold that 
Title VII does not protect transsexuals); Miles v. New York Univ., 979 F. Supp. 248, 249 
(S.D.N.Y. 1997) (deciding Title IX prohibits sexual harassment of a transsexual woman); 
Declaratory Ruling on Behalf of John/Jane Doe (Conn. Human Rights Comm’n 2000) 
(relying on Price Waterhouse, Schwenk, Rosa, and other recent federal court decisions in 
holding that the Connecticut state statute prohibiting discrimination on the basis of sex 
encompasses discrimination against transgender individuals); Doe v. Yunits, 2000 WL 
33162199 (Mass. Super. 2000), aff’d sub nom, Doe v. Brockton Sch. Comm., No. 2000-J-
638 (Mass. App. 2000) (denying defendant’s motion to dismiss transsexual student 
plaintiff’s complaint requesting injunctive relief allowing her to wear clothing customarily 
worn by female teenagers). 
 45. 378 F.3d 566, 571 (6th Cir. 2004). 
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Gender Identity Disorder and began to present at work as female.46  Smith’s 
co-workers commented that her appearance and mannerisms were not 
masculine enough and Smith’s employer subjected her to numerous 
psychological evaluations before suspending her.47  Smith filed suit under 
Title VII alleging that her employer had discriminated against her because 
of sex “both because of her gender non-conforming conduct and more 
generally because of her identification as a transsexual.”48  The Sixth 
Circuit concluded that discrimination against a plaintiff who is a transsexual 
and therefore fails to act and/or identify with his or her gender is the same 
as discrimination directed against the plaintiff in Price Waterhouse.49  In 
doing so, the Smith court explained “sex stereotyping based on a person’s 
gender non-conforming behavior is impermissible discrimination, 
irrespective of the cause of that behavior; a label, such as ‘transsexual,’ is 
not fatal to a sex discrimination claim where the victim has suffered 
discrimination because of his or her gender non-conformity.”50  The Sixth 
Circuit adopted this principle a year later in Barnes v. City of Cincinnati,51 
when it affirmed the trial court’s holding that a pre-operative male-to-
female transsexual law enforcement officer was discriminated against on 
the basis of sex in violation of Title VII, based on the officer’s allegations 
of adverse treatment for his failure to conform to sex stereotypes relative to 
how a man should look and behave on the police force.52 
In 2007, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals delineated between claims 
based on sex stereotyping and those based on transgender status.53  The 
court found that although Title VII does not protect an individual based on 
his or her transgender status alone, he or she can sustain a claim based on 
sex stereotyping.54  In Etsitty v. Utah Transit Authority,55 the Utah Transit 
Authority terminated Etsitty for her position as a bus driver because of her 
transition from male to female, which the Utah Transit Authority argued 
that the public would see as “inappropriate” and which the organization felt 
                                                                                                     
 46. Id. 
 47. See id.  
 48. Id. 
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. at 575. 
 51. 401 F.3d 729 (6th Cir. 2005).  
 52. See id. at 738 (affirming the ruling of the district court). 
 53. See Etsitty v. Utah Transit Auth., 502 F.3d 1215, 1222–23 (10th Cir. 2007) 
(distinguishing between stereotyping based on sex and transgender status). 
 54. See id. (allowing a claim  based on sex stereotyping to proceed). 
 55. 502 F. 3d 1215 (10th Cir. 2007). 
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created an image issue.56  The Tenth Circuit recognized that Title VII 
protects transgender persons who are discriminated against because they do 
not conform to gender stereotypes regardless of the employee’s status as a 
transgender person.57  Nevertheless, the former employee’s claim failed in 
Etsitty because the court found there was insufficient evidence to prove 
discrimination based upon gender stereotypes.58 
The D.C. district court, however, held that transgender individuals 
need not argue sex stereotyping in order to sustain a claim for 
discrimination under Title VII.59  In Schroer v. Billington, the district court 
held that transgendered people are already protected by Title VII’s ban on 
sex discrimination.60  The court found that Schroer was entitled to relief 
based on the language of Title VII itself, reasoning that discrimination on 
the basis of an individual’s transition from one sex to another constituted 
discrimination because of sex.61 
The decision in D.C. was followed by the more conservative holding 
by the Eleventh Circuit in Glenn v. Brumby.62  Glenn was diagnosed with 
Gender Identity Disorder (“GID”) and in 2007, Glenn informed her 
immediate supervisor that she planned to transition from male to female.63  
Glenn’s immediate supervisor notified the General Assembly’s Legislative 
Counsel, Sewell Brumby, who was the head of the office in which Glenn 
worked.64  After confirming that Glenn intended to transition, Brumby fired 
her on the spot.65  Glenn brought suit, alleging that her firing violated the 
Constitution’s equal protection guarantee.66  The court held that defendant 
violated the Equal Protection Clause’s prohibition of sex-based 
discrimination when he fired a transgender or transsexual employee 
because of her gender non-conformity.67  The court also held that defendant 
                                                                                                     
 56. Id. at 1219–20. 
 57. See id. at 1223–24 (deciding Title VII protects transgendered individuals who are 
not listed as a transgendered individual for employment purposes). 
 58. See id. at 1227 (ruling there was not enough evidence to make a finding of 
discrimination). 
 59. Schroer v. Billington, 577 F. Supp. 2d 293 (D.D.C. 2008). 
 60. See id. at 306. 
 61. See id. at 306–08. 
 62. 663 F.3d 1312, 1312–16 (11th Cir. 2011). 
 63. Id. at 1316. 
 64. Id. 
 65. See id.  
 66. See id.  
 67. See Glenn v. Brumby, 663 F.3d 1312, 1312–1316 (11th Cir. 2011). 
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had advanced no reason that could qualify as governmental purpose, much 
less an “important” governmental purpose, and even less than that a 
“sufficiently important government purpose” that was achieved by firing 
plaintiff because of her gender non-conformity.68 
The Eleventh Circuit stated that consideration of gender stereotyping 
will inherently be a part of what drives discrimination against a 
transgendered individual.69  The employer testified that he had fired the 
complainant because he considered it inappropriate for her to appear at 
work dressed as a woman and that he found it unsettling and unnatural that 
she would appear wearing women’s clothing.70  According to the Eleventh 
Circuit, this testimony “provides ample direct evidence” to support the 
conclusion that the employer acted on the basis of the plaintiff’s gender 
nonconformity and therefore granted summary judgment to her.71  The 
court explained: “the very acts that define transgender people as 
transgender are those that contradict stereotypes of gender appropriate 
appearance and behavior. There is thus a congruence between 
discriminating against transgender and transsexual individuals and 
discrimination on the basis of gender-based behavioral norms.”72  
Accordingly, the court found that discrimination against a transgender 
individual because of her gender nonconformity is sex discrimination, 
whether it’s described as being on the basis of sex or gender.73 
Based on the above precedent, the full Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission (“EEOC”) held in Macy v. Dept of Justice74 that 
discrimination against an individual based on a belief that that person is 
transgender is prohibited sex discrimination, termed “gender identity 
discrimination,” under Title VII.  Macy involved a transgender woman who 
applied for a civilian position in the Alcohol Tobacco and Firearm's 
(“ATF”) Walnut Creek, California crime laboratory.75  At the time of her 
                                                                                                     
 68. Id. at 1316. 
 69. See id. at 1316–17 . 
 70. Id. at 1321. 
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 72. Glenn v. Brumby, 663 F.3d 1312, 1321 (11th Cir. 2011).  
 73. Id. at 1316–17. 
 74. Macy v. Dept. of Justice, EEOC Appeal No. 0120120821, 2012 WL 1435995 
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Salem, Schwenk v. Harford, and Rosa v. Park West Bank & Trust Co). 
 75. Id. at 1. 
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application, Macy was a police detective in Phoenix living as a man.76  She 
interviewed for the position over the phone as a man and was told that the 
job was hers so long as she successfully completed a background check.77  
During the background check process Macy informed Aspen, the company 
contracted to perform the check, that she was in the process of transitioning 
from male to female and she requested that Aspen inform the Director of 
the Walnut Creek lab of the change.78  Aspen did so and five days later, 
Macy received an email stating that due to budgetary reductions, the 
position was no longer available.79  A month later, Macy contacted an 
agency EEO counselor to discuss her concerns and the counselor informed 
Macy that the position had not been cut, but that another individual who 
was farther along in the background check process had been hired.80  Macy 
filed a complaint with the EEOC charging discrimination on the basis of 
sex and gender identity and sex stereotyping as the basis of her complaint.81 
The EEOC found that as used in Title VII, the term “sex” 
“encompasses both sex—that is, the biological differences between men 
and women—and gender.”82  As the Eleventh Circuit noted in Glenn v. 
Brumby,83 six members of the Supreme Court in Price Waterhouse agreed 
that Title VII barred “not just discrimination because of biological sex, but 
also gender stereotyping-failing to act and appear according to expectations 
defined by gender.”84  As such, the terms “gender” and “sex” are used 
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 77. Id. 
 78. Id. 
 79. Id. 
 80. Macy v. Dept. of Justice, EEOC Appeal No. 0120120821, 2012 WL 1435995 at 2 
(Apr. 20, 2012). 
 81. See id. at 3 (finding that the Agency could only process Macy’s claim based on sex 
under Title VII and the EEOC’s Part 1614 regulations).  Her claim based on “gender identity 
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 82. Schwenk v. Hartford, 204 F.3d 1187, 1202 (9th Cir. 2000); see also Smith v. City 
of Salem, 378 F.3d 566, 572 (6th Cir. 2004) (“The Supreme Court made clear that in the 
context of Title VII, discrimination because of ‘sex’ includes gender discrimination.”). 
 83. 663 F.3d 1312, 1316 (11th Cir. 2011). 
 84. See Macy, 2012 WL 1435995 at 5. 
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interchangeably to describe the discrimination prohibited by Title VII.85  
“Congress’s intent to forbid employers to take gender into account in 
making employment decisions appears on the face of the statute.”86  The 
EEOC reaffirmed that Title VII prohibits discrimination beyond merely 
biological based discrimination because the term “gender” encompasses not 
only a person’s biological sex but also the cultural and social aspects 
associated with masculinity and femininity.87  The EEOC stated that gender 
discrimination occurs any time an employer treats an employee differently 
for failing to conform to any gender-based expectations or norms.88  “When 
an employer discriminates against someone because the person is 
transgender, the employer has engaged in disparate treatment “related to the 
sex of the victim.”89  This is true regardless of whether an employer 
discriminates against an employee because the individual has expressed his 
or her gender in a non-stereotypical fashion,90 because the employer is 
uncomfortable with the fact that the person has transitioned or is in the 
process of transitioning from one gender to another, or because the 
employer simply does not like that the person is identifying as a transgender 
person.91  In each of these circumstances, the employer is making a gender-
based evaluation, thus violating the Supreme Court’s admonition that “an 
employer may not take gender into account in making an employment 
decision.”92 
Under Macy, regardless of whether there is any specific evidence of 
gender stereotyping in a particular case, treating a person differently 
                                                                                                     
 85. See, e.g., Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 230 (1989) (emphasis 
added). 
 86. Macy v. Dept. of Justice, EEOC Appeal No. 0120120821, 2012 WL 1435995 1, 5 
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because the person has changed his or her sex or intends to change sex is 
automatically unlawful sex discrimination under Title VII, just as 
discrimination against a person who is one religion and converts to another 
is considered a type of religious discrimination.93  The Macy decision made 
clear that transgender people do not need to rely on sex-stereotyping claims 
to support a charge of sex discrimination.  The key fact is whether the 
employer relied on the employee’s gender when making its decision to 
discriminate; so, if an employer takes into account a person's gender when 
deciding whether or not his and/or her identity or conduct is appropriate, 
then it is sex discrimination.  Albeit untested, this is a positive outcome 
against gender identity discrimination. The progeny of Price Waterhouse 
has followed a different trajectory, however, for sexual orientation claims. 
ii.  Sexual Orientation 
Although the Supreme Court has found that same sex sexual 
harassment is prohibited under Title VII,94 courts have continuously held 
that Title VII’s prohibition against sex discrimination does not encompass 
sexual orientation.95  Nevertheless, Price Waterhouse did pave the way for 
                                                                                                     
 93. See Glenn v. Brumby, 663 F.3d 1312 (11th Cir. 2011); Schroer v. Billington, 577 
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 94. In Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs, Inc. the Supreme Court held workplace 
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 95. In DeSantis v. Pacific Telephone & Telegraph Co., 608 F.2d 327, 329–32 (9th Cir. 
1979) overruled on other grounds by Nichols v. Azteca Rest. Enters., 256 F.3d 864, 875 (9th 
Cir. 2001), the Ninth Circuit said that Title VII does not prohibit discrimination on the basis 
of sexual orientation.  The Ninth Circuit held that “Title VII’s prohibition of ‘sex’ 
discrimination applies only to discrimination on the basis of gender and should not be 
judicially extended to include sexual preference such as homosexuality.”  DeSantis, 608 
F.2d at 329–30.  The court found that Title VII does not apply to sexual orientation because 
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some sexual orientation claims arising from sex stereotyping.  In Prowel v. 
Wise Business Forms, Inc.,96 the Third Circuit found that Title VII does not 
prohibit sexual orientation discrimination, but the court explained sexual 
orientation and sexual stereotyping discrimination claims are difficult to 
separate and that a sexual stereotyping claim is cognizable.97  Prowel 
involved an employee who did not conform to male gender stereotypes and 
who was harassed by his co-workers because of his effeminacy, as well as 
his perceived homosexuality.98  Eventually, Prowel was terminated from his 
factory job and sued his employer on the basis of sex discrimination under 
Title VII.99  In that case, the circuit court vacated the district court’s 
judgment dismissing Prowel’s claim and held that Prowel could argue a sex 
discrimination claim based on sexual stereotyping, however the court 
warned that sexual orientation claims cannot be made under Title VII.100 
A number of other courts have likewise held that sexual orientation 
discrimination is not prohibited under Title VII.  The Sixth Circuit in 
Gilbert v. Country Music Association, Inc. held that under Title VII, sexual 
orientation is not a prohibited basis for discriminatory acts.101  The court 
found that “a claim premised on sexual-orientation discrimination thus does 
not state a claim upon which relief may be granted.”102  Since Gilbert’s 
claims were solely based on sexual orientation discrimination, rather than 
sexual stereotyping allegations, he could not obtain relief under Title VII.103  
In Dawson v. Bumble & Bumble,104 the Second Circuit held “[t]he law is 
well-settled in this circuit and in all others to have reached the question 
that . . . Title VII does not prohibit harassment or discrimination because of 
                                                                                                     
1) earlier case law has determined that the congressional intent behind Title VII’s 
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Holloway v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 566 F.2d 659, 661 (9th Cir. 1977)); 2) later Congresses 
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 96. 579 F.3d 285 (3rd Cir. 2009).  In 2006, the Sixth Circuit held in Vickers v. 
Fairfield Medical Center, 453 F.3d 757 (6th Cir. 2006) (Sixth Circuit says that claim of sex 
discrimination in sexual harassment claim fails as a matter of law because the discrimination 
was because of sexual orientation). 
 97. Id. 
 98. Id. 
 99. Id. 
 100. Id. 
 101. See 432 F. App’x. 516 (6th Cir. 2011). 
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sexual orientation.”105  “Like other courts, we have therefore recognized 
that a gender stereotyping claim should not be used to ‘bootstrap protection 
for sexual orientation into Title VII.’”106 
Despite the reluctance of some courts, the EEOC has found that claims 
by lesbian, gay, and bisexual individuals alleging sex-stereotyping state a 
sex discrimination claim under Title VII. In Veretto v. U.S. Postal 
Service,107 the EEOC found that the U.S. Postal Service erred in dismissing 
a claim of sex stereotyping discrimination under Title VII.108  In that case, a 
postal service worker alleged that he was harassed after his wedding 
announcement, stating his intention to wed a man, rather than a woman, 
was published in a local newspaper.109  The EEOC said that while the U.S. 
Postal Service was correct that Title VII’s prohibition of discrimination 
does not include sexual orientation as a basis, Title VII does prohibit sex-
stereotyping discrimination.110 
In Castello v. U.S. Postal Service,111 the EEOC, on appeal, found that 
Castello alleged a plausible sex stereotyping case, which would entitle her 
to relief under Title VII if she were to prevail.112  Castello worked as a mail 
handler in New Orleans and filed a complaint that the agency subjected her 
to discriminatory harassment when the manager of distribution made 
sexually explicit comments to the Castello.113  In her complaint, she listed 
“sexual orientation/sex-female” as the discrimination factors.114  The U. S. 
Postal Service dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim, because 
it determined that she was alleging harassment on the basis of sexual 
orientation and noted that sexual orientation was not a basis covered by the 
EEOC Regulations.115  On appeal, she asserted she was the victim of 
ongoing workplace harassment in violation of the agency’s Policy on 
Workplace Harassment.116  Castello alleged that she was subjected to a 
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hostile work environment when her supervisor made an offensive and 
derogatory comment about her having relationships with women.117  
Essentially, Castello alleged that her supervisor’s comment was motivated 
by his attitudes about stereotypical gender roles in relationships.118  The 
EEOC found that this was sufficient for Castello to allege a claim of sex 
stereotyping, even where the hostile comments regarded Castello’s sexual 
orientation.119 
Although it has provided an avenue for LGB individuals to file 
charges of discrimination, the EEOC’s interpretation of “sex” is more 
limited where discrimination involves sexual orientation, rather than gender 
identity. The EEOC has not interpreted Title VII’s prohibition against sex 
discrimination to include sexual orientation discrimination as a stand-alone 
claim, the way it has with gender identity discrimination.  Further, no court 
has moved beyond a claim of sex stereotyping to allow a freestanding 
sexual orientation discrimination claim, thus leaving a gaping hole in the 
protection of LGB individuals from workplace discrimination. 
B.  Statutory Law 
While the courts and federal agencies have been struggling to interpret 
the meaning of “sex,” legislators have been trying to enact legislation, in 
the form of the Employment Non-Discrimination Act (“ENDA”), that more 
clearly prohibits discrimination. The ENDA would “provid[e] a 
comprehensive [f]ederal prohibition of employment discrimination on the 
basis of sexual orientation or gender identity.”120  The chief provision of the 
ENDA would make it unlawful for most employers covered by Title VII, 
including the states, to “fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, 
or otherwise discriminate against any individual . . . because of such 
individual’s actual or perceived sexual orientation or gender identity.”121  
The ENDA would also prohibit retaliation, and its enforcement mechanisms 
and remedies would largely be the same as those of Title VII.122 
ENDA was first introduced in Congress in 1994.123  Different versions 
of employment protections for lesbian, gay, and bisexual people, however, 
                                                                                                     
 117. Id. 
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have been introduced since the early 1970s.124  At the time the ENDA was 
first introduced, it only included protections for LGB people.125  
Representative Barney Frank (D-MA) sponsored the first transgender-
inclusive version of the ENDA in April 2007. Five months later, he 
introduced a new version of the bill that omitted all mention of gender 
identity and extended protections only to gays, lesbians, and bisexuals.  In 
explaining the decision, Frank stated that while “we have the votes to pass a 
bill today in the House that would ban discrimination in employment based 
on sexual orientation . . . sadly, we don’t yet have [the votes] on gender 
identity.”126 
Representative Frank again introduced a transgender-inclusive version 
of ENDA in the U.S. House of Representatives in 2009 with 137 co-
sponsors; and the bill was subsequently referred to the Committees on 
Education and Labor, House Administration, Oversight and Government 
Reform, and the Judiciary.127  In December of 2010, however, work on the 
ENDA bill was postponed in the House Committee on Education and 
Labor.128  Frank reintroduced the bill with 148 co-sponsors on April 6, 
2011; and a similar bill with thirty-nine co-sponsors was also introduced in 
the U.S. Senate on April 13, 2011.129  The bills were referred to committee 
without further action.  
Most recently, Representative Jared Polis introduced an ENDA bill in 
the House and Senator Jeff Merkley introduced an ENDA bill in the Senate 
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on April 25, 2013.130  The U.S. Senate Committee on Health, Education, 
Labor and Pensions adopted the ENDA by a bipartisan vote of 15-7 on July 
10, 2013.131   
On the state level, sixteen states and the District of Columbia already 
ban discrimination based on sexual orientation and gender 
identity/expression. 132  An additional five states ban discrimination on the 
basis of sexual orientation.133 
III.  What Happens Next? 
A.  Likelihood of ENDA's Passage in Obama's Second Term  
Unfortunately, it is unlikely that the ENDA will pass under the current 
Congress or the next without significant changes to the congressional make-
up.  Politically, the 113th Congress that was sworn in in January of 2013 is 
not much different than the 112th Congress it replaced.134  Republicans 
continue to control the House of Representatives and Democrats continue to 
have a slight majority in the Senate.  The balance of power is unchanged. 
There is slightly more diversity in the current make-up of Congress 
than ever before.  There are six openly gay or bisexual individuals in the 
House of Representatives, and the Senate has its first Lesbian Senator—
former Rep. Tammy Baldwin. The House has its first Hindu Representative 
and the Senate has its first Buddhist Senator.135  Yet, the number of women 
and racial or ethnic minorities continues to increase at a snail’s pace.  
Congress remains far whiter, wealthier, and more male than the nation’s 
population.  Nevertheless, it appears that the increasingly diverse Congress 
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members are forcing some of their colleagues to rethink the concept of 
equal rights, including those surrounding gay rights and homosexuality.  
The presence of openly gay men and women and their families was a factor 
that some believe was instrumental for states where same-sex marriage was 
legalized by legislatures.136  Seeing those non-traditional families in the 
public eye may have helped put a human face on a concept that many 
legislators had thought about only in the abstract.137 
Yet even with the opportunities gay men, lesbians, and bisexuals say 
their membership in Congress presents, their reception has not been a 
completely warm one.  One of the first acts of the current Republican-
controlled House was to set aside funds to defend the 1996 law that 
prohibits the recognition of same-sex marriages because the Obama 
administration stopped supporting it.138  Also, the make-up of Congress 
shows just how much of a climb gay rights supporters face.  The Human 
Rights Campaign (“HRC”) said that it counts only 184 of 435 members of 
the House as solid supporters on the issue of gay rights.139  By contrast, 
HRC counts 220—a majority—as opponents of gay rights.140  In the Senate, 
the group says it considers forty-two members opposed to gay rights and 
forty-two in favor.141 
Moreover, many politicians used their opposition to gay rights as a 
platform to gain votes in their election campaigns. For example, 
Representative Michele Bachman described being gay as “bondage” and 
“part of Satan.”142  In 2004, while Bachman served in the Minnesota state 
legislature, she proposed an amendment to the Minnesota Constitution to 
ban same-sex marriage.143  Without the amendment, she said at the time, 
“sex curriculum would essentially be taught by the gay community” and 
“little K-12 children will be forced to learn that homosexuality is normal, 
natural, and perhaps they should try it.”144  She has even claimed that the 
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high rate of suicide among gay teens is due simply to being gay, not to 
bullying or discrimination.145 
Steve King who won a seat in 2012 representing his district in the state 
of Iowa in the House said he feared his state would become a “gay marriage 
Mecca” after a 2009 state Supreme Court decision struck down barriers to 
legal marriage by same-sex couples.146  He went on a bus tour around the 
state encouraging voters to recall the justices who joined in that decision; 
the three who were up for retention votes in 2010 were indeed ousted.147  
King also has contended that marriage equality will be a step toward a 
society that takes children away from their parents to be raised in 
warehouses.148 
Florida Representative Allen West once said that people don’t get fired 
for being gay, so antidiscrimination laws are unnecessary.149  He opposed 
repeal of “don’t ask, don’t tell” on the grounds that gay and lesbian service 
members “can change their behavior,” adding that repeal was the first step 
in a process that would eventually “break down the military.”150  He also 
has said that “[t]he term ‘gay marriage’ is an oxymoron,” and with its 
legalization, along with abortion and the national debt, “it just becomes a 
matter of time before you don’t have society.”151 
Marsha Blackburn, who represents her congressional district in 
Tennessee, co-chaired the committee that drafted 2012’s national 
Republican platform, considered the most anti-gay in history.152  Platform 
contributor Tony Perkins, president of the anti-gay Family Research 
Council, boasted of his friendship with Blackburn as key to getting so much 
of his hateful language adopted.153  Among other things, the platform says, 
“[t]he court-ordered redefinition of marriage in several States . . . is an 
assault on the foundations of our society, challenging the institution which, 
for thousands of years in virtually every civilization, has been entrusted 
with the rearing of children and the transmission of cultural values.”154  
According to the platform, such an “activist judiciary . . . [is] a serious 
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threat to our country’s constitutional order, perhaps even more dangerous 
than presidential malfeasance.”155  And President Obama’s gay-friendly 
policies, including his administration’s decision to stop defending the 
Defense of Marriage Act in court, amount to “a mockery of the President’s 
inaugural oath.”156 
These are just a few examples of the vitriolic and extremist campaign 
rhetoric that plagued the 2012 Congressional elections where politicians 
sought to divide the country into pro-gay or anti-gay camps.  By taking 
such extreme stances on these issues, those politicians who won their 
campaigns have put themselves in the position of being unable to work 
together with more liberal legislators or to reach compromises to provide 
rights and protections to all of the nation’s citizens.  The bad blood means it 
will be that much harder to work together on any issue, much less one so 
emotionally charged. 
Further, if the congressional record on these issues is any indication, 
then the future is bleak.  Congress’s record on the passage of protective 
legislation is spotty at best.  Gains have been made in some areas.  For 
example, hate crimes based on sexual orientation or gender identity are now 
punishable by federal law under the Matthew Shepard and James Byrd, Jr. 
Hate Crimes Prevention Act of 2009.157  Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell was 
repealed in 2011, though almost all Republicans voted against the repeal.158 
If not for the recent intervention of the Supreme Court,, the Defense of 
Marriage Act (“DOMA”), passed in 1996 and signed by then-President Bill 
Clinton, still would be good law.159  Further, the reauthorization of the 
Violence Against Women Act—a bill that since its initial passing has 
traditionally received bipartisan support—was blocked numerous times in 
2012 and 2013 before finally passing in February 2013.160 
Due to partisan discord, the 112th Congress was the most 
unproductive session since the 1940s.161  A number of the bills it passed 
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were small and noncontroversial.  Meanwhile, significant pieces of 
legislation have been blocked.  The politicians often filled their time in 
session with time-wasting, divisive political maneuvering.  For example, 
House Republicans have held votes to repeal the Affordable Care Act more 
than forty times since gaining control of the chamber in 2011, despite the 
fact that such a measure has no chance of passing the Democratically 
controlled Senate or being signed by President Obama.162  Another 
egregious example is of the 115 times the Republican minority held up a 
bill's passage by threatening to filibuster it.163  Those on both ends of the 
political spectrum have noted the lack of bipartisanship in Congress.  In 
April of 2012, Thomas Mann of the left-leaning Brookings Institution and 
Norm Ornstein of the conservative American Enterprise Institute worked 
together to publish a Washington Post op-ed saying that the GOP deserves 
the blame for the dysfunction.164 
Ultimately, “given the extended use of filibuster and partisan bickering 
Congress, we will likely see much of the same gridlock and acrimony 
exhibited over the last two years.  This means that . . . the most likely 
course for progress until after the mid-term elections in 2014 remains with 
the Obama Administration[,] the federal administrative agencies, [and the 
courts].”165 
B.  Likelihood of Congressional Expansion of Title VII Protections 
As an alternative to enacting ENDA, it has been proposed that a better 
remedy is for Congress to amend the “because of sex” provision of Title 
VII to prohibit discrimination “because of gender,” defined to include 
sexual orientation and gender identity.166  “Sex” refers to an anatomical 
classification as male or female, while “gender” refers to socially 
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constructed norms associated with sex.  As discussed above, courts have 
already interpreted Title VII to allow some kinds of claims based on gender 
rather than sex, but have refused to recognize sexual orientation as part of 
gender.167  Congress could modify Title VII’s prohibitions to force a 
different outcome in the courts—a move not unprecedented. 
When the courts adopted a narrow interpretation of “sex” that 
excluded pregnancy, Congress responded through Title VII instead of 
enacting a separate law about pregnancy.168  In Geduldig v. Aiello,169 the 
Supreme Court infamously declared that pregnancy discrimination was not 
sex discrimination because it distinguished between “pregnant women and 
non-pregnant persons,” rather than between men and women.170  Congress 
responded by defining “because of sex” to include “because of 
pregnancy.”171  By crafting the Pregnancy Discrimination Act (“PDA”) not 
as a separate discrimination law but as an amendment to Title VII, 
Congress symbolically rejected the reasoning of Geduldig.  This eventually 
led the Court to uphold the Family Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”) as sex 
equality legislation, suggesting that Congress’s view has prevailed.172  
Rather than enact a stand-alone Employment Non-Discrimination Act 
(“ENDA”) or add “sexual orientation” to the list of prohibited 
classifications within Title VII, it has been suggested that Congress should 
do what it did with the PDA: 
Title VII should be revised in two respects:  (1) the word “sex” in 
42 USC sec. 2000e-2, which prohibits discriminatory 
employment practices, should be replaced by gender wherever it 
appears; (2) the first sentence in the definition of “because of 
sex,” found at 42 USC sec. 2000e(k) should be revised to say, 
“The terms ‘because of gender’ or ‘on the basis of gender’ 
include, but are not limited to, because of or on the basis of 
sexual orientation; gender identity; and pregnancy, childbirth, or 
related medical conditions.”173 
The most recent version of the ENDA lacks several of Title VII’s 
protections, such as the right to file disparate impact claims and or seek 
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affirmative action as a remedy for proven discrimination.174  Certain 
commentators criticize the ENDA for prohibiting disparate impact claims; 
whereas Title VII allows claims instituted pursuant to the disparate impact 
doctrine.175  Another concern is whether voluntary affirmative action 
programs would be permissible under the ENDA.  Section 4(f) of HR 1755 
expressly forbids quotas and preferential treatment on the basis of perceived 
sexual orientation or gender identity.176  The concern is that this might 
preclude employers from adopting voluntary affirmative action programs.  
Also, it would perpetuate the idea that gender identity or sexual orientation 
discrimination should be treated differently from other forms of 
discrimination.  Amending Title VII, rather than passing the ENDA, could 
alleviate those concerns. 
Another important reason to unite the ENDA with “because of sex” is 
to avoid perpetuating the problem of intersectionality.177  If the ENDA is 
passed as a standalone statute rather than as a gender amendment to Title 
VII, if straight women and gay men have fared well, the lesbian plaintiff 
may lose on both the ENDA and Title VII counts.178  Moreover, having 
separate statutes with separate remedial structures will make it even more 
important for the factfinder to isolate the claims, parse the evidence more 
finely, and ignore intersectionality.179  Congress has a clear opportunity 
with the ENDA to avoid the problem by instead passing a gender 
amendment.180   
Cases will be more difficult to win if sex discrimination and sexual 
orientation discrimination are deemed so distinct that they do not even 
belong in the same statute.  By introducing the ENDA as a separate piece of 
legislation, Congress is engaging in a symbolic contradiction.  Title VII was 
originally enacted to protect against discrimination against especially 
vulnerable groups of people and to promote equality in the workplace.  Not 
including sexual orientation discrimination in Title VII suggests that while 
employees should benefit from a workplace free from  discrimination; 
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sexual orientation discrimination is distinct from other protected 
characteristics. 
Finally, tying the ENDA to sex discrimination with a gender 
amendment to Title VII instead of a standalone statute could have important 
consequences for the scope of Congress’s power to prohibit discrimination 
on the basis of sexual orientation and gender identity.181  The ENDA must 
be backed up by Congress’s power to enforce the 14th Amendment.182  A 
freestanding the ENDA virtually guarantees that sexual orientation will fall 
into the “other” category of suspect classifications not protected by the 14th 
amendment applicable to civil rights laws.183 
Unfortunately, the same reasons which make it unlikely the ENDA 
will pass during President Obama’s remaining time in office portend that 
Title VII will not be amended over the next four years.  If Congress cannot 
work together to pass the ENDA, it is highly unlikely enough votes could 
be garnered to amend Title VII, no matter the public benefit. 
C.  Could a Change in Judicial Interpretation Expand Protection? 
i.  Gender Identity 
If Congress does not pass the ENDA and does not modify the text or 
the meaning of Title VII legislatively, recourse for victims of gender 
identity or sexual orientation discrimination lies with the courts.  “As a 
legal matter, Macy does not definitively determine that Title VII protects 
transgender people.  Ultimately, the U.S. Supreme Court decides what a 
federal statute means—and the Court may eventually be asked whether 
“sex” in existing statutes includes the discrimination that transgender 
people face.”184  Until the Supreme Court rules, federal courts are free to 
disregard the determination by the EEOC if the court rules the EEOC’s 
determination fails to adequately state or interpret existing law.  However, 
although courts are not bound by the EEOC’s decision, they often give the 
EEOC’s guidance a great deal of deference and will enforce the EEOC’s 
interpretation of the law.185 
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Additionally, federal agencies are fully bound by the EEOC 
decision.186  Now, the EEO counselors which process claims in each federal 
agency are required to accept these complaints by transgender people as 
forbidden sex discrimination.187  Many private sector employers are also 
bound by the decision if they are federal contractors.188  Accordingly, 
regardless of whether lower courts enforce the EEOC’s interpretation, many 
employers will have to enforce the holding of Macy until the Supreme 
Court says otherwise.  Further, in an effort to avoid liability private 
employers may follow suit.  For now at least, the tide has turned in favor of 
gender identity protection. 
ii.  Sexual Orientation 
On the other hand, the EEOC has issued no similar guidance to protect 
victims of sexual orientation discrimination in employment.  Therefore, 
courts will continue to dismiss claims made on the basis of sexual 
orientation discrimination unless the courts begin to analyze these cases in a 
new way.  The answer may lie in the theory of relational discrimination.189  
Relational discrimination cases allege discrimination because of the 
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claimant’s relationship with another person.190  Courts have recognized 
cognizable claims under Title VII’s prohibition of race discrimination 
where a white employee or applicant was discriminated against because of 
his or her relationship with a person of another race.191  For example, in 
Gresham v. Waffle House, Inc., the Northern District of Georgia found that 
the claimant had a cognizable claim under Title VII where she, a white 
female, alleged she had been discharged from her job because of her 
marriage to a black man.192  The court found, “if the plaintiff in the instant 
case, had been black, the alleged discrimination would not have occurred. 
In other words . . . but for [her] being white, the plaintiff[] in [this] case[] 
would not have been discriminated against.”193  In Tetro v. Elliot Popham 
Pontiac, Oldsmobile, Buick & GMC Trucks, the Sixth Circuit held that a 
“white employee who is discharged because his child is biracial is 
discriminated against on the basis of his race, even though the root animus 
for the discrimination is prejudice against the biracial child.”194  Courts 
have also held that relational discrimination is prohibited in national origin 
cases. For example, in Reiter v. Center Consolidated School District,195  a 
Colorado district court held that discriminatory employment practices based 
on an individual’s association with people of a particular race or national 
origin are prohibited under Title VII.196 
“Sex” is listed as parallel to the prohibitions against discrimination on 
the basis of race and national origin under Title VII. Therefore, the phrase 
“because of such individual’s,” which is interpreted relationally by the 
courts in the race context, should be interpreted in the same way in the 
context of the protected category of “sex.”197  Accordingly, in addition to 
the traditional protection for discrimination based on an individual’s sex 
when viewed in isolation, applying the relational discrimination analysis 
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would mean that courts would also take into account claims in which an 
individual is discriminated against based on his or her sex when viewed in 
relation to others.198 
One benefit of the relational interpretation analysis is that courts will 
not need to reinterpret “sex” to mean anything other than gender.  “In fact, a 
gender-based interpretation is at the core of the argument.  Rather than 
focusing on the meaning of the word “sex,” the question is reframed as 
whether one is being discriminated against based on one’s gender vis-a-vis 
the person with whom he or she is in a relationship.”199  If the courts apply 
the theory of relational discrimination to the sexual orientation 
discrimination context and enforce the EEOC’s interpretation in gender 
identity cases, there will no longer be a need for an amendment to Title VII 
or passage of the ENDA. 
In the last few years, the executive branch of the federal government 
has come out definitively in support of LGB equality, taking the position 
that heightened scrutiny is warranted for classifications that target lesbians 
and gay men, and supporting gay marriage equality.200  Further, twenty-one 
states already ban discrimination based on sexual orientation and/or gender 
identity/expression and seventeen states and the District of Columbia allow 
gay marriage or civil unions.201  Statutory law is changing, legal 
interpretation is broadening, and this term the Supreme Court held that anti-
gay marriage laws violated the equal protection of gay couples who wished 
to marry.202  Collectively, these developments suggest a major 
transformation in the minds of the majority of Americans regarding the 
social meaning of LGB status.  With federal and state policy and popular 
opinion in favor of protection, courts may be more willing to hear and adopt 
a new theory of protection, such as relational discrimination, in the near 
future. 
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IV.  Recommendations & Conclusions 
Regardless of whether the lower courts take an expansive view of the 
recent holding in United States v. Windsor or find room for protection by 
way of the theory of relational discrimination, eventually it will be 
necessary to codify court rulings in favor of gender identity or sexual 
orientation discrimination protection.  Inevitably, the Macy ruling and 
others like it fail to answer many of the practical questions employers will 
face while trying to prevent, identify, and remedy discrimination in the 
workplace that are best answered directly by laws and their interpretive 
regulations and guidance.  Such questions include those related to dress 
codes, what constitutes harassment, confidentiality, sex-segregated 
facilities, etc.203 As for the choice between the ENDA and a modification to 
Title VII, modifying Title VII would result in the best possible outcome 
because courts will be forced to provide the same analysis and remedies to 
claims for discrimination on the basis of race or national origin.  It will also 
make a clear statement to the public that discrimination on the basis of 
gender identity or sexual orientation is seen the same as other forms of 
discrimination. 
“An equally important purpose of passing laws for the rights of LGBT 
people is to change society’s culture and attitudes towards the community. 
Laws against discrimination . . . can change entire workplace cultures about 
what is appropriate and not appropriate in an employment setting.  Given 
the pervasiveness and intransigence of the problem of discrimination 
against LGBT people—of whom seventy-eight percent report mistreatment, 
harassment, or discrimination at work204—a massive cultural change is 
needed.  The cultural change triggered by the passage of a law is just as 
important as the creation of legal recourse and the ability to win a case in 
court.  “The passage of a law, especially a federal law, creates an 
educational moment that motivates employers to make immediate changes 
in policies and conduct training to make sure discrimination doesn't occur 
in the first place.”205 
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Even if no workplace advances are made at the legislative or judicial 
level, it is clear that the executive branch has committed to advancement of 
equality throughout the President’s second term.  The current 
administration's equal rights-friendly policies have resulted in other areas of 
protection, and more and more states are following suit, as are many large 
corporations.  Progress is happening and I believe that it will continue in the 
near future. 
